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Paradoxically, the emergence of Arctic cooperation was assisted, to a large extent, by the fact that the 
region was a global periphery – albeit a theatre for strategic and geopolitical games between the big 
powers. The collapse of the Soviet Union contributed to the audacious 1987 speech by Mihail 
Gorbatshov in Murmansk, whereby he was envisaging a peaceful and environmentally sound Arctic.  
Towards the Ottawa Declaration 
Finland picked up Gorbatshov’s ideas, to see what could be followed up. Environmental concerns 
appeared to be the area where common understanding seemed to be wide among Arctic actors. Finland 
started consultations on operational level with Arctic states, getting Canada as an active partner. The 
first circumpolar meeting was held in Rovaniemi in 1989, followed by the first intergovernmental Arctic 
meeting of ministers of the environment of all Arctic states in 1991, also in Rovaniemi, where the 
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) was adopted. This then led the way to the Ottawa 
Declaration and the establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996. 
Although the Arctic Council is lead by the Foreign Ministers, the mandate was from the outset heavily 
environmental. The Council has six permanent working groups – some founded already before 1996, 
some after that. Four working groups are directly dealing with environmental issues, and looked after 
by environmental authorities and experts in the eight Arctic states. 
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The Ottawa Declaration was not framed to restrict the Council’s activities but in one regard: military 
security. This footnote in the Declaration reflected the views of the founding fathers of the day – which 
still stand today. 
A unique feature of Arctic cooperation is the role of indigenous peoples. At the beginning they were 
invited to the meetings as Observers, but that was not acceptable particularly to North American 
indigenous peoples. They demanded a position on the level of governments, which then was confirmed 
in the Ottawa Declaration. Permanent Participants, consisting of six indigenous groups, sit in Council 
meetings together with governmental representatives; only without the right to vote (but then again, 
has the Council ever voted?) 
The First 20 Years 
During its first decade, the Council was consolidating its structures and procedures. Then it started to 
face a new phenomena: the rapidly growing interest by non-Arctic actors. The exceptional development 
in 2007 with a record area of melting sea ice in the Arctic led to a new focus on both prospects of off-
shore hydrocarbon exploitation and opening sea routes in the Arctic Ocean. Since the Arctic Council 
had become the pre-eminent Arctic discussion forum, this global interest was channeled through 
increasing applications to observer status in the Council. The applications came from governments as 
well as scientific and advocacy organizations, including UN specialized agencies. 
During the second decade, the biggest political – and also logistical – challenge for the Arctic Council 
has been the question of observers. While all member states agreed on the need to strengthen the 
Council, there was no agreement on the observers. For some observers were part of the solution – an 
essential element in strengthening the Council – while others considered them as part of the problem 
and wanted to build up the Council first from inside and then deal with observers from a position of 
power. Simultaneously, the Permanent Participants were cautious on increasing numbers of observers, 
fearing that to diminish their voice in the Council. There were references to the earlier understanding 
that the number of observers should not exceed the number of member states and Permanent 
Participants. 
Hence three consecutive Council Chairmanship periods 2007-2013 were working on this issue, first 
establishing criteria and a detailed manual for observers and then considering applications on the basis 
of criteria. During the second half of the Swedish Chairmanship period 2012-13 it is not an 
exaggeration to say that the Council was at a crossroads: either to make the right decision on the 
observers or being slowly marginalized. The warning signs were already there; the emerging open and 
inclusive fora such as the Arctic Circle in Reykjavik or the Arctic Frontiers in Tromsø. So in case the 
Council wanted to remain a closed club, the alternative fora were ready to step in. 
However, the Kiruna ministerial meeting in May 2013 was able to find a solution in the right direction, 
accepting most of the state applications. Decision on organizations was deferred in block. The sticking 
point was the European Union (EU).  
Canada, supported by Russia, was opposing the EU application on the basis of the seal product ban 
imposed by the EU. Finally, thanks to U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s mediating skills, a 
compromise solution was found, whereby the EU application was considered affirmatively, but final 
decision was deferred until the seal issue was settled. 
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During the second Canadian Chairmanship 2013-15, the Ukrainian crisis was overshadowing the 
Council deliberations to the extent that although the seal problem with Canada was solved, a consensus 
on the EU application was not found at the ministerial meeting in 2015. 
Another challenge to the Council came from emerging cooperation between the Arctic five coastal 
states. Two ministerial meetings by the Arctic Five (Greenland 2008 and Québec 2010) were opposed 
by other Council states Finland, Iceland and Sweden, as well as Permanent Participants. Since then no 
ministerial meetings by the Arctic Five have been held, however working level meetings have been 
convened on fisheries, aiming at arrangements regulating fishing in the Arctic Ocean. 
One of major achievements of the Canadian Chairmanship was the establishment of the Arctic 
Economic Council (AEC) in September 2014. The AEC is the child of the Council, but at the same 
time an independent entity. It still remains to a large extent a work in progress, both internally as well as 
in its relation to the Council. However, it is significant that the Council, with the establishment of the 
AEC, acknowledged the importance of taking into account the economic and business considerations 
in the region. It was a high time, since more and more global companies and financing institutions (not 
to talk about the World Economic Forum or WEF) are looking at Arctic opportunities. 
During its existence, the Council has been changing. The Council and its working groups, task forces 
and expert groups have produced major assessments on the Arctic. The range of activities has carefully 
but steadily expanded from environmental agenda to science and research, to maritime issues, and also 
to legally binding agreements. The two agreements in force on search and rescue, as well as on 
maritime oil pollution preparedness and response, and those in the pipeline (such as on Arctic scientific 
cooperation) are not precisely Arctic Council agreements, but agreements between Council member 
states. However, by them, the growing normative role of the Council is a fact. 
Furthermore, steps to strengthen the Council internally have been taken. The Council has now a 
permanent secretariat and a small administrative budget. Also some operational funds for limited 
activities have been initiated. 
The Way Ahead 
A few years ago the Arctic Council was considered to be “the best kept secret success story in the 
Arctic.” With its communication strategy and action plan the awareness of the Council has been 
increasing. But with the rapid and largely unpredictable change in the Arctic the question remains: can 
the Council keep up with the change? How to respond to growing expectations? 
There are a number of challenges the Arctic Council is facing: 
The Council’s mandate is limited. Environmental, social and scientific issues are covered, but many 
(such as security, economy and fisheries) are outside. Major changes in this regard are not possible 
without touching the Council structures and, ultimately, the Ottawa Declaration. And here the Pandora’s 
Box effect comes to the play. Everyone understands that the Council cannot stay complacent, but the 
progress is slow by necessity. 
The decision-making process is complex. Many scientists and NGO’s criticize the Council of weak 
response to emerging Arctic issues. If voting is not customary in the Council proceedings, consensus 
requirement in all decision-making effectively replaces it. It suffices to have one, at any time, to break 
the consensus. This principle is at the core of the Arctic Council cooperation, so any changes here do 
not seem to be in the cards. 
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An exclusive or inclusive forum. There is no common view among Council members on who is the 
Arctic stakeholder. This is a question about Observers, but it is also increasingly a question concerning 
participation. The Arctic agreements are so far open to only Council member states. But there are good 
arguments to include observers and other Arctic stakeholders in joining the agreements. At the same 
time, a lot can be done to enhance the interaction between member states, indigenous peoples and 
Observers within the Council proceedings. 
The Arctic in a global context. The Arctic is indisputably a regional issue with a global reach. Also in 
this respect the Council cannot act in a vacuum, but it has to take into account and collaborate with 
other international and global institutions and actors. Contacts with IMO – and its Polar Code – are 
steps into the right direction. 
From soft-law discussion forum to a treaty-based organization? There are those who prefer the Council 
to stay a decision-shaper rather than a decision-maker, and those to whom a new institution is an 
impediment. Accordingly, there is no consensus on making the Arctic Council an international 
organization. But at the same time, the Council by its very activities is moving to that direction. 
Whether – or when – the Council would become a legal entity, is an open question; but a question 
which warrants careful consideration. 
To introduce and carry out changes in the Arctic Council requires long and persistent work. The U.S. 
Arctic Council Chairmanship (2015-2017) has realized just that, and consequently sought continuity 
with many issues from the next Chairmanship.  
Finland takes the lead in the Council in May 2017 as Chair for the second time. The Finnish record 
augurs well for the Chairmanship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
